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Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy-preserving distributed learning and evaluation of machine learning models by analyzing it
in the widespread MapReduce abstraction that we extend with privacy constraints. Following this abstraction, we instantiate SPINDLE (Scalable
Privacy-preservINg Distributed LEarning), an operational distributed system that supports the privacy-preserving training and evaluation of
generalized linear models on distributed datasets. SPINDLE enables the efficient execution of distributed gradient descent while ensuring data and
model confidentiality, as long as at least one of the data providers is honest-but-curious. The trained model is then used for oblivious predictions
on confidential data. SPINDLE is able to efficiently perform demanding training tasks that require a high number of iterations on large input data
with thousands of features, distributed among hundreds of data providers. It relies on a multiparty homomorphic encryption scheme to execute
high-depth computations on encrypted data without significant overhead. It further leverages on its distributed construction and the packing
capabilities of the cryptographic scheme to efficiently parallelize the computations at multiple levels. In our evaluation, SPINDLE performs the
training of a logistic-regression model on a dataset of one million samples with 32 features distributed among 160 data providers in less than
176 seconds, yielding similar accuracy to non-secure centralized models.
I. INTRODUCTION
The training of machine-learning (ML) models usually requires large and diverse datasets. In many domains, such as medicine and finance,
assembling sufficiently large datasets has been proven difficult [111] and often requires the sharing of data among multiple data providers.
This is particularly true in medicine, where patients’ data are spread among multiple entities: For example, for rare diseases, one hospital
might have only a few patients, whereas a medical study requires hundreds of them to produce meaningful results. Data sharing among
many entities, which can be disseminated over multiple countries, is hence required. However, when the data are sensitive and personal,
they are particularly difficult to share. Data sharing is highly restricted by legal regulations, such as GDPR [5] in Europe. The financial and
reputational consequences of a data breach often make the risk of data sharing higher than its potential benefits. Hence, it is almost impossible
to obtain sufficient data to train ML models that are key enablers in medical research [77], finance analysis [99], and many other domains.
To this end, privacy-preserving solutions are gaining interest as they can be key-enablers for ML with sensitive data. Many solutions have
been proposed for secure predictions using pre-trained models [12], [17], [44], [58], [69], [90], [91], [92]. However, the secure training of ML
models, which is much more computationally demanding, has been less studied. Some centralized solutions [10], [15], [23], [29], [48], [57],
[59], [61], relying on homomorphic encryption (HE) have been proposed. They have the advantage of being straightforward to implement but
require individual records to be transferred out of the control of their owners, which is often not possible, e.g., due to data protection legislation.
Also, the data are moved to a central repository, which can become a single point of failure. Secure multiparty computation solutions
(SMC) proposed for this scenario [8], [28], [42], [43], [54], [75], [82], often assume that the computing parties are honest-but-curious and
non-colluding. These assumptions might not hold when the data are sensitive and/or when the parties have competing interests. In contrast,
homomorphic encryption-based (HE) or hybrid (HE and SMC) solutions [41], [114], that assume a malicious threat model (e.g., Anytrust
model [106]), focus on limited ML operations (e.g., the training of regularized linear models with low number of features) and are not
quantum-secure. Recent advances in quantum computing [3], [45], [79], [98], [110], have made this technology a potential threat for existing
cryptographic solutions [76] in a not so far future. Google recently announced that they have reached "quantum-supremacy" [47] and even
though these solutions are still far from being usable, certain data (e.g., genomics) can remain sensitive over a long period, and will be at
risk in the future.
Most of the aforementioned distributed solutions are practical only with a small number of parties and focus either on training or prediction.
Moreover, they do not consider the complete ML workflow, nor enable the training of a model that remains secret and enables oblivious
prediction on confidential data. In many cases, the trained model is as sensitive as the data on which it is trained, and the use of the model
after the training has to be tightly controlled. ML is used in very competitive domains and a balance has to be found between collaboration
and competition [77], [97], [99]. For example, entities that collaborate to train a ML model should all equally benefit from the resulting
model, and its usage has to be controlled.
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy-preserving learning and prediction among multiple parties, i.e., data providers (DPs), that
do not trust each other. To this end, we design a solution that leverages the MapReduce abstraction [32] which is often used to define distributed
ML tasks [27], [102]. MapReduce defines parallel and distributed algorithms in a simple and well-known abstraction: PREPARE (data
preparation), MAP (distributed computations executed independently by multiple nodes or machines), COMBINE (combination of the MAP
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results, e.g., aggregation) and REDUCE (computation on the combined results). We build on and extend this abstraction to determine and delimit
which information, e.g., MAP outputs, have to be protected to design a decentralizedprivacy-preserving system for ML training and prediction.
The model is locally trained by the DPs (MAP) and the results are iteratively combined (COMBINE) to update the global model (REDUCE).
We leverage the partitioned (distributed) data to enable DPs to keep control of their respective data, and we distribute the computation to
provide an efficient solution for the training of ML models on confidential data. After the training, the model is kept secret from any entity
and is obliviously and collectively used to provide predictions on confidential data that are known only to the entity requesting the prediction.
We propose SPINDLE (Scalable Privacy-preservINg Distributed LEarning), a system that enables the privacy-preserving training of and
prediction on generalized linear models (GLMs) [80], (e.g., linear, logistic and multinomial logistic regressions), on a dataset distributed
among many DPs. SPINDLE ensures data and model confidentiality, as long as at least one-out-of-N DPs is honest-but-curious (or honest).
It builds on a distributed (cooperative) instantiation of the widely-used stochastic mini-batch gradient descent (SGD), and a state-of-the-art
multiparty, lattice-based, quantum-resistant cryptographic scheme. GLMs are easily interpretable, capture complex non-linear relations (e.g.,
logistic regression), and are widely-used in many domains such as finance, engineering, environmental studies and healthcare [68]. Moreover,
by building SPINDLE on SGD, we provide a generic and widely-applicable system that can be further extended to other ML models. In
fact, SGD can be used for training many different ML models [34], [46], [63], [100], [113].
In a realistic scenario where a dataset of 11,500 samples and 90 features is distributed among 10 DPs, SPINDLE efficiently trains a logistic
regression model in less than 54 seconds, achieving an accuracy of 83.9%, equivalent to a non-secure centralized solution. The distribution
of the workload enables SPINDLE to efficiently cope with a large number of DPs (parties), as its execution time is practically independent
of it. Moreover, it accommodates a large number of features, by optimizing the use of the cryptosystem’s packing capabilities, leveraging
single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) operations. It is able to perform demanding training tasks, with high number of iterations and thus
high-depth computations, by relying on the multiparty cryptoscheme’s ability to collectively refresh a ciphertext with no significant overhead.
These represent a notable improvement with respect to state-of-the-art secure solutions, such as Helen [114] and Drynx [41]. Under the
same adversarial model, Helen scales quadratically in both the number of parties and number of features, and can only perform a limited
number of iterations. Drynx scales linearly with the number of parties, but combinatorially with the number of features.
In this work, we make the following contributions: leftmargin=*
• We analyze the problem of privacy-preserving distributed training and evaluation of ML models by extending the widespread
MapReduce abstraction with privacy constraints. Following this abstraction, we instantiate SPINDLE, an operational and efficient
distributed system that enables the privacy-preserving execution of a complete machine-learning workflow, i.e., data preparation,
learning, and prediction for generalized linear models, on a dataset that is distributed among many data providers.
• We propose multiple optimizations that enable efficient use of a quantum-resistant multiparty (N-party) cryptographic scheme by
relying on parallel computations, SIMD operations, efficient collective operations and optimized polynomial approximations of the
models’ activation functions, e.g., sigmoid and softmax.
• We propose a method for the parameterization of SPINDLE by capturing the relations among the security and the learning parameters
in a graphical model.
• We evaluate SPINDLE against centralized and decentralized secure solutions and demonstrate its scalability and accuracy.
To the best of our knowledge, SPINDLE is the first operational system that provides the aforementioned features and security guarantees.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy-Preserving Training of Machine Learning Models. Some works have focused on securely outsourcing the training of linear
ML models to the cloud, typically by using homomorphic encryption (HE) techniques [10], [15], [29], [48], [59], [61], [86]. For instance,
Graepel et al. [48] outsource the training of a linear classifier by employing somewhat HE [38], whereas Aono et al. [10] approximate logistic
regression, and outsource its computation to the cloud by using additive HE [83]. Jiang et al. [57] present a framework for outsourcing logistic
regression training to public clouds by combining HE with hardware-based security techniques (i.e., Software Guard Extensions). Although
the end goal of SPINDLE is also to train a generalized linear model in a privacy-friendly manner, we consider a substantially different setting
where the sensitive data are distributed among multiple (untrusted) data providers.
Along the research direction of privacy-preserving distributed learning, most works operate on the two-server model, where data owners en-
crypt or secret-share their data among two non-colluding servers that are responsible for the computations. For instance, Nikolaenko et al. [82]
combine additive homomorphic encryption (AHE) and Yao’s garbled circuits [108] to enable ridge regression on data that is horizontally
partitioned among multiple data providers. Gascon et al. [42] extend Nikolaenko et al. work [82] to the case of vertically partitioned datasets
and improve its computation time by employing a novel conjugate gradient descend (GD) method, whereas Giacomelli et al. [43] further reduce
computation and communication overheads by using only AHE. Akavia et al. [8] improve the performance of Giacomelli et al. protocols [43]
by performing linear regression on packed encrypted data. Mohassel and Zhang [75] develop techniques to handle secure arithmetic operations
on decimal numbers, and employ stochastic GD, which, along with multi-party-computation-friendly alternatives for non-linear activation
functions, supports the training of logistic regression and neural network models. Schoppmann et al. [93] propose data structures that exploit
data sparsity to develop secure computation protocols for nearest neighbors, naive Bayes, and logistic regression classification. SPINDLE
differs from these approaches as it does not restrict to the two non-colluding server model, and focuses instead on N-party systems, with N>2.
Other distributed and privacy-preserving ML approaches employ a three-server model and rely on secret-sharing techniques to train linear
regressions [13], logistic regressions [26], and neural networks [74], [103]. However, such solutions are tailored to the three-party server
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model and assume an honest majority among the computing parties. An honest majority is also required in the recent work of Rachuri and
Suresh [89], who improve on Mohassel and Rindal [74] performance by extending its techniques to the four-party setting. Other works
focus on the training of ML models among N-parties (N>4), with stronger security assumptions, i.e., each party trusting itself. For instance,
Corrigan-Gibbs and Boneh [28] present Prio, which relies on secret-sharing to enable the training of linear models, and Zheng et al. [114]
propose Helen, a system that uses HE [83] and verifiable secret sharing [30] to execute ADMM [19] (alternating direction method of
multipliers, a convex optimization approach for distributed data), which supports regularized linear models. Similarly, Froelicher et al. [41]
employ HE [36], along with encoding techniques, to enable the training of basic regression models and provide auditability with the use
of zero-knowledge proofs. SPINDLE enables better scalability in terms of the number of model’s features, size of the dataset and number
of data providers, and it offers richer functionalities by relying on the generic and widely-applicable SGD.
Another line of research considers the use of differential privacy for training ML models. Early works [7], [22] focus on a centralized setting
where a trusted party holds the data, trains the ML model, and performs the noise addition. Differential privacy has also been envisioned in dis-
tributed settings, where to collectively train a model, multiple parties exchange or send differentially private model parameters to a central server
[35], [53], [65], [95]. However, the training of an accurate collective model requires very high privacy budgets and, as such, it is unclear what
privacy protection is achieved in practice [55]. To this end, some works consider hybrid approaches where differential privacy is combined with
HE [60], [85], or multi-party computation techniques [56], [101]. We consider differential privacy as an orthogonal approach; these techniques
can be combined with our solution to protect the resulting models and their predictions from inference attacks [39], [96], see Appendix A.
Privacy-Preserving Prediction onMLModels. Another line of work is focused on privacy-preserving ML prediction, where a party (e.g.,
a cloud provider) holds an already trained ML model on which another party (e.g., a client) wants to evaluate its private input. In this
setting, Bost et al. [17] use additive HE techniques to evaluate naive Bayes and decision tree classifiers, whereas Gilad-Bachrach et al. [44]
employ fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [16] to perform prediction on a small neural network. The computation overhead of these
approaches has been further optimized by using multi-party computation (MPC) techniques [91], [92], or by combining HE and MPC [58],
[69], [88]. Riazi et al. [90] evaluate deep neural networks by employing garbled circuits and oblivious transfer, in combination with binary
neural networks. Boemer et al. [12] propose nGraph-HE2, a compiler that enables service providers to deploy their trained ML models in a
privacy-preserving manner. Their method uses HE, or a hybrid scheme that combines HE with MPC, to compile ML models that are trained
with well-known frameworks such as TensorFlow [6] and PyTorch [84]. The scope of our work is broader than these approaches, as SPINDLE
accounts not only for the private evaluation of machine-learning models but also for their privacy-preserving training in the distributed setting.
III. SPINDLE OVERVIEW
We first introduce the problem of privacy-preserving distributed training and evaluation of machine-learning (ML) models. Then, we
present a high-level overview and architecture of a solution that satisfies the security requirements of the presented problem. In Section IV,
we instantiate our solution in a system, SPINDLE, that enables the training and evaluation of the widely-used Generalized Linear Models [80].
In the rest of this paper, matrices are denoted by upper-case-bold characters and vectors by lowercase-bold characters; the i-th row of a
matrixX is depicted asX[i,·], and its i-th column asX[·,i]. Similarly, the i-th element of a vector y is denoted by y[i]. We provide a list
of recurrent symbols in Table I (see Appendix D).
A. Problem Statement
We consider a setting where a dataset (Xn×c,yn), with Xn×c a matrix of n records and c features, and yn a vector of n labels, is
distributed among a set of data providers, i.e., S={DP1,...,DP|S|}. The dataset is horizontally partitioned, i.e., each data provider DPi
holds a partition of ni samples (X(i),y(i)), with
∑|S|
i=1ni=n. A querier, which can also be a data provider (DP), requests the training of
a ML model on the distributed dataset (Xn×c,yn) or the evaluation of an already trained model on its input (X′,·).
We assume that the DPs are willing to contribute their respective data to train and to evaluate ML models on the distributed dataset. To this
end, DPs are all interconnected and organized in a topology that enables efficient execution of the computations. For instance, as depicted
in Figure 1, they can be organized in a tree structure that enables parallelization for query executions.
Although the DPs wish to collaborate for the execution of ML workflows, they do not trust each other. As a result, they seek to protect
the confidentiality of their data (used for training and evaluation) and of the collectively learned model. More formally, we require that the
following privacy properties must hold in an Anytrust model [106], where at least one DP and the querier are honest-but-curious (or honest):
(a) DataConfidentiality:The training data of each data providerDPi, i.e., (X(i),y(i)) and the querier’s evaluation data (X′,·) should remain
only known to their respective owners. To this end, data confidentiality is satisfied as long as the involved parties (DPs and querier) do not obtain
any information about other parties’ inputs other than what can be deduced from the output of the process of training or evaluating a model.
(b) Model Confidentiality: During the training process, no data providerDPi should gain more information about the model that is being
trained than what it can learn from its own input data, i.e., (X(i),y(i)). During prediction, the querier should not learn anything more about
the model than what it can infer from its input data (X′,·) and the corresponding predictions y′.
We remark here that input correctness and computation correctness are not part of the problem requirements, i.e., we assume that DPs do
not input incorrect data and do not perform wrong computations. In summary, confidentiality has to be ensured as long as one data provider
is honest, whereas correctness is guaranteed if all the data providers are honest. We discuss these issues and possible countermeasures against
malicious DPs in Section VII and Appendix A.
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Fig. 1: SPINDLE’s Model. Thick arrows represent a possible (efficient) query-execution flow.
B. Solution Overview
To address the problem of privacy-preserving distributed learning, we leverage the MapReduce abstraction, which is often used to capture
the parallel and repetitive nature of distributed learning tasks [27], [102]. In summary, MapReduce works as follows: the data providers (DPs)
pre-process their data (PREPARE) before they iteratively train the model locally on their data (MAP). Subsequently, they combine their local
models (COMBINE) and update the global model (REDUCE). To capture the complete ML workflow, we extend the MapReduce architecture
with a PREDICTION phase. We also complement this abstraction with a protection mechanism P(·) such that P(x) denotes that value x
has to be protected to satisfy the security properties of data and model confidentiality (Section III-A). We present the extended MapReduce
abstraction in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 Extended MapReduce Abstraction.
TRAINING: S receivesQR from Querier and outputs P(W (·,g)G )
1: EachDPi has (X(i), y(i))
2: DPs agree on lp, g, andDPR – PREPARE
3: EachDPi∈S initializesW (i,0)
4: for j=1,...,g do
5: EachDPi∈S computes: – MAP
P(W (i,j))←Map((X(i),y(i)),P(W (·,j−1)G ),P(W (i,j−1)))
6: EachDPi sends P(W (i,j)) toDPR – COMBINE
7: DPR computes: P(W (·,j))←C(P(W (i,j))), ∀DPi ∈ S
– REDUCE
8: DPR computes: P(WG(·,j))←Red(P(WG(·,j−1)),P(W (·,j)))
PREDICTION:DPR receives P(X′) from Querier and uses P(WG(·,g))
to compute P(y′) that is sent back to the Querier
In the TRAINING, the set of data providers S receives the querier’s request QR, which contains the type of model to train, the set of
features, and the label definition, and outputs the (protected) global model P(WG(·,g)), trained on the DPs’ private data for g training
iterations. In the PREDICTION, the protected model P(W (·,g)G ) is used by one DP to perform predictions P(y
′) on the querier’s protected
evaluation data P(X′).
We describe the training phase in more detail. During PREPARE, the DPs agree on the learning parameters lp (e.g., the learning rate α)
and on one data provider DPR that is responsible for the execution of REDUCE. Each data provider DPi also initializes its local model
W (i,0) and executes some pre-computations on its inputs. Then, the following steps (i.e., MAP, COMBINE, REDUCE) are repeated g times.
During iteration j, in MAP, eachDPi updates its protected local model P(W (i,j)) using its input data (X(i),y(i)), the global model of the
previous iteration P(W (·,j−1)G ), and its previous local model P(W
(i,j−1)); then, it outputs its updated protected local model P(W (i,j)).
In COMBINE, the contributions P(W (i,j)) of eachDPi, are securely combined with an application-dependent function C(·). In REDUCE,
DPR updates the global model P(W
(·,j)
G ) that is then broadcast to all DPs.
IV. SPINDLE DESIGN
Following the extended MapReduce abstraction described in Section III-B, we design a system, named SPINDLE, that enables the training
of and prediction on Generalized Linear Models [80]. To perform the distributed training, it relies on the widely applicable cooperative
gradient descent [104], [105] – which minimizes many cost functions used in machine-learning [63], [100], [113]. To implement the
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protection mechanism P(·), it builds on a multiparty fully homomorphic encryption scheme. We introduce these concepts in Section IV-A.
Then, in Section IV-B, we describe how SPINDLE instantiates the phases of the extended MapReduce abstraction and how we address the
collective data-processing on the distributed dataset through secure and interactive protocols. We also demonstrate how training is performed,
notably by executing the gradient descent operations under homomorphic encryption, and how predictions are executed on encrypted models.
The detailed cryptographic operations are presented in Section V.
A. Background
Generalized LinearModels (GLMs).GLMs [80] are a generalization of linear models where the linear predictor, i.e., the combinationXw
of the feature matrixX and weights vectorw, is related to a vector of class labels y by an activation function σ such thatE(y)=σ−1(Xw),
whereE(y) is the mean of y. In this work, we consider the widely-used linear (i.e., σ(Xw)=Xw), logistic (i.e., σ(Xw)=1/(1+e−Xw))
and multinomial (i.e., σ(Xwλ) = eXwλ/(
∑
j∈cle
Xwj), for λ∈ cl) regression models. We remark that for multinomial regression, the
weights are represented as a matrixWc×|cl|, where c is the number of features, cl is the set of class labels and |cl| its cardinality. In the rest
of the paper, unless otherwise stated, we define the operations on a single vector of weightsw and we note that in the case of multinomial
regression, they are replicated on the |cl| vectors of weights, i.e., each column ofWc×|cl|.
Cooperative Gradient Descent. To train GLMs, we rely on a distributed version of the popular mini-batch stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) [63], [100], [113]. In the standard version of SGD, the goal is to minimize minw[F(w):=(1/n)
∑n
φ=1 f(w;X[φ,·])], where f(·) is
the loss function defined by the learning model,w ∈Rc are the model parameters, andX[φ,·] is the φth data sample (row) ofX. The model
is then updated by m iterationsw(l) =w(l−1)−α[ζ(w(l−1); B(l))], for l = 1, ..., m, with α the learning rate,B(l) a randomly sampled
sub-matrix ofX of size b×c, and ζ(w;B)=BT (σ(Bw)−I(z)), where z is the vector of labels corresponding to the batchB and I(·)
depends on the type of regression. For linear and logistic regression, I(·) is the identity function. For multinomial, where z[φ]∈cl, it is an
indicator function which outputs a vector whose elements, with λ ∈ cl, are 1 when y[φ]=λ and 0 otherwise.
We rely on the cooperative SGD (CSGD) proposed by Wang and Joshi [104], [105], due to its properties; in particular: (i) modularity,
as it can be synchronous or asynchronous, and can be combined with classic gradient-descent convergence optimizations such as Nesterov
accelerated SGD [81]; (ii) applicability, as it accommodates any ML model that can be trained with SGD and enables the distribution of
any SGD based solution; (iii) it guarantees a bound on the error-convergence depending on the distributed parameters; e.g., the number of
iterations and the update function for the global weights [104], [105], [18], [112]; and (iv) it has been shown to work well even in the case
of non-independent-and-identically-distributed (non-i.i.d.) data partitions [71], [104], [105]. The data providers (DPs), each of which owns a
part of the dataset, locally perform multiple iterations of the SGD before aggregating their model weights into the global model weights. The
global weights are included in subsequent local DP computations to avoid that they learn, or descend, in the wrong direction. For simplicity,
we present SPINDLE with the synchronous CSGD version, where the DPs perform local model updates simultaneously. In more detail, for
eachDPi, the local update rule at global iteration j and local iteration l is:
w(i,j,l)=w(i,j,l-1)−αζ(w(i,j,l-1);B(l))−αρ(w(i,j,l-1)−w(·,j-1)G ), (1)
wherew(·,j−1)G are the global weights from the last global update iteration j−1, α is the learning rate and ρ, the elastic rate, is the parameter
that controls how much the data providers can diverge from the global model. The set of DPs S performsm local iterations between each
update of the global model that is updated at global iteration j with a moving average by:
w
(·,j)
G =(1−|S|αρ)w
(·,j−1)
G −αρ
∑|S|
i=0w
(i,j,m). (2)
Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption. For the protection mechanism of SPINDLE, we rely on a multiparty (or distributed) fully-
homomorphic encryption scheme [78] in which the secret key is distributed among the parties, while the corresponding collective public
key pk is known to all of them. Thus, each party can independently compute on ciphertexts encrypted under pk but all parties have to
collaborate to decrypt a ciphertext. In SPINDLE, this enables the data providers (DPs) to train a collectively encrypted model, that cannot
be decrypted as long as one DP is honest and refuses to participate in the decryption. As we show later, this multiparty scheme also enables
DPs to collectively switch the encryption key of a ciphertext from pk to another public key without decrypting. In SPINDLE, a collectively
encrypted prediction result can thus be switched to the querier’s public key, so that only the querier can decrypt the result.
Mouchet et al. [78] propose a multiparty version of the Brakerski Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) lattice-based homomorphic cryptosystem [38]
and introduce interactive protocols for key generation, decryption, and bootstrapping. We use an adaptation of this multiparty scheme to the
Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song cryptosystem (CKKS) [25] that enables approximate arithmetic, and whose security is based on the ring learning with
errors (RLWE) problem [70]. Here, we describe the main parameters of the CKKS cryptographic scheme and the multiparty cryptographic
operations used in SPINDLE; we refer to the work of Cheon et al. [25] for details of the CKKS cryptoscheme and to that of Mouchet et al. [78]
for the complete definition and the security of the distributed protocols.
CKKS enables arithmetic over CN/2; the plaintext and ciphertext spaces share the same domainRQ=ZQ[X]/(XN+1), withN a power
of 2. Both plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented by polynomials ofN coefficients (degreeN−1) in this domain. A plaintext/ciphertext
encodes a vector of up toN/2 values.
Parameters: The CKKS parameters are denoted by the tuple (N,∆,η,mc), where N is the ring dimension, ∆ is the plaintext scale, or
precision, by which any value is multiplied before being encrypted/encoded, η is the standard deviation of the noise distribution, andmc
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represents a chain of moduli {q0,...,qL} such that Πι∈{0,...,τ}qι=Qτ is the ciphertext modulus at level τ , withQL=Q, the modulus of fresh
ciphertexts. Operations on a level-τ ciphertext 〈v〉 are performed moduloQτ , with ∆ always lower than the currentQτ . Ciphertexts at level τ
are simply vectors of polynomials inRQτ , that we represent as 〈v〉when there is no ambiguity about their level, and use {〈v〉,τ,∆} otherwise.
After performing operations that increase the noise and the plaintext scale, {〈v〉,τ,∆} has to be rescaled (see the ReScale(·) procedure
defined below) and the next operations are performed moduloQτ−1. When reaching level 0, 〈v〉 has to be bootstrapped. The security of
the cryptosystem depends on the choice ofN ,Q and η, which in this work are parameterized to achieve at least 128-bits of security.
Operations: We introduce in Scheme IV.1 the operations of CKKS that are used in this paper. v is a vector of cleartext values, sk and pk
are the secret and public keys, and evk is an evaluation key. When two ciphertexts are multiplied together, the result has to be relinearized
Relin(·) to avoid that the ciphertext size grows. After multiple Rescale(·) operations, 〈v〉 has to be refreshed by a Bootstrap(·), which returns
a ciphertext of level τ <L. The dot product DM(·) of two encrypted vectors of size a can be executed by combining a multiplication with
log2(a) inner-left rotations and additions.
Encrypt: 〈v〉pk={{〈v〉,τ,∆},L,∆}pk=Enc(pk,v)
Decrypt: v=Dec(sk,〈v〉pk)
Add: {〈v1〉+ 〈v2〉,min(τ,τ ′),max(∆,∆′)}=
{〈v1〉,τ,∆}+ {〈v2〉,τ ′,∆′}
Mult: {〈v3〉,min(τ,τ ′),∆∆′}=M({〈v1〉,τ,∆}, {〈v2〉,τ ′,∆′})
Rot: {〈v′〉,τ,∆}= RotL/R({〈v〉,τ,∆},r,evk)
Rescale: {〈v〉,τ−1,∆′}= ReScale({〈v〉,τ,∆})
Relin: {〈v〉,τ,∆}= Relin({〈v〉,τ,∆}, evk)
Bootstrap: {〈v〉,τ,∆}= Bootstrap({〈v〉,0,∆},evk)
Scheme IV.1: CKKS operations.
Distributed Protocols: In Scheme IV.2, we define four protocols using the distributed version of CKKS. These protocols require the participa-
tion of all DPs, i.e., eachDPi contributes its respective secret key ski. DKeyGen(·) generates the collective public key pk and evaluation keys
evks by combining the protocols defined by Mouchet et al. [78]. These keys can then be used independently (without interaction) by a DP
on a ciphertext 〈v〉pk. The distribution of the scheme enables an efficient distributed bootstrapping DBootstrap(〈v〉,τb,∆,{ski}) to collective
refresh 〈v〉 to its initial level L. The minimum level τb at which the bootstrapping has to be performed depends on the security parameters.
The DKeySwitch(·) enables the DPs to change a ciphertext encryption from the public key pk to another public key pk′, without decrypting
the ciphertext. A distributed decryption operation DDec(·) is a special case of the DKeySwitch(·) where there is no pk′, i.e., pk′ is 0.
Distrib. Key Gen: pk,evks= DKeyGen({ski})
Distrib. Bootstrap: {〈v〉,L,∆}=DBootstrap(〈v〉,τb,∆,{ski})
Distrib. Key Switch: 〈v〉pk′ = DKeySwitch(〈v〉pk,pk′,{ski})
Distrib. Decrypt: v=DDec(〈v〉,{ski})
Scheme IV.2: Distributed CKKS operations.
B. SPINDLE Protocols
1) TRAINING: We first describe SPINDLE’s operations for training a Generalized Linear Model following Protocol 1. In this case, the
modelW is a vector of weights that we denote byw, and MAP corresponds to multiple local iterations of the gradient descent. Recall that
in the case of multinomial regression, all operations are repeated for each label class λ ∈ cl.
PREPARE. The data providers (DPs) collectively agree on the training parameters: the maximum number of global g and localm iterations,
and the learning parameters lp={α,ρ,b}, where α is the learning rate, ρ the elastic rate, and b the batch size. The DPs also collectively
initialize the cryptographic keys for the distributed CKKS scheme by executing DKeyGen(·) (see Section IV-A). Then, the DPs initialize
their local weights and pre-compute operations that involve only their input data (αX(i)I(y(i)) and αX(i)T ). We discuss in Section IX how
the DPs can collaborate to standardize or normalize the distributed dataset (if needed) and check that their respective inputs are consistent,
e.g., they have data distribution homogeneity.
MAP. As depicted in Protocol 2, the DPs executem iterations of the cooperative gradient-descent local update (Section IV-A). The local
weights ofDPi (i.e., 〈w(i,j,l−1)〉) are updated at a global iteration j and a local iteration l by computing the gradient (Protocol 2, lines 4,
5, and 6) that is then combined with the current global weights 〈w(·,j−1)G 〉 (Protocol 2, line 7) following Equation 1. These computations
are performed on batches of b samples and c features. To ensure that the update ofDPi’s local weights, i.e., the link between the ciphertexts
〈w(i,j−1)〉=〈w(i,j,0)〉 and 〈w(i,j,m)〉, does not leak information about the DP’s local data, 〈w(i,j,m)〉 is re-randomized RR(·) at the end
of MAP, i.e.,DPi adds to it a fresh encryption of 0. Note that in Protocol 2, line 5 the activation function σ(·) is computed on the encrypted
vector 〈u〉 (or a matrix 〈U〉 in the case of multinomial). The exponential activation functions for logistic (i.e., sigmoid) and multinomial (i.e.,
softmax) regressions have to be approximated to polynomial functions to be evaluated on encrypted data by using the homomorphic properties
of CKKS. We rely on a least-square polynomial approximation (LSPA) for the sigmoid, as it provides an optimal average mean-square error
for uniform inputs in a specific interval, which is a reasonable assumption when the input distribution is not known. For softmax, we rely on
Chebyshev approximation (CA) to minimize the maximum approximation error and thus avoid that the function diverges on specific inputs.
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Protocol 2 MAP.
EachDPi outputs 〈w(i,j)〉←Map((X(i),y(i)),〈w(·,j−1)G 〉,〈w(i,j−1)〉)
1: 〈w(i,j,0)〉=〈w(i,j−1)〉
2: for l=1,...,m :
3: Select batch (B,z) of b rows in (X(i),y(i))
4: 〈u[k]〉=DM(B[k,·],〈w(i,j,l−1)〉), for k = 1, ..., b
5: 〈v[e]〉=DM(αB[·,e]T ,σ(〈u〉)), for e=1,...,c
6: µ[e]=
∑b
k=1αB[·,e]T I(z[k]), for e=1,...,c
7: 〈w(i,j,l)〉= 〈w(i,j,l−1)〉+µ-〈v〉-αρ(〈w(i,j,l−1)〉-〈wG(·,j−1)〉)
8: 〈w(i,j)〉=RR(〈w(i,j,m)〉)
The approximation intervals can be empirically determined by using synthetic datasets with distribution similar to the real ones, by computing
the minimum and maximum input values over all DPs and features, or by relying on estimations based on the data distribution [51]. Protocol 3
takes as input an encrypted vector/matrix 〈u〉 or 〈U〉 and the type of the regression t (i.e., linear, logistic or multinomial). If t is linear, the
protocol simply returns 〈u〉. Otherwise, if t is logistic, it computes the activated vector 〈σ(u)〉 by using the sigmoid’s LSPA (apSigmoid(·)).
If t is multinomial, it computes the activated matrix 〈σ(U)〉 using the softmax approximation that is computed by the multiplication of two
CAs, one for the nominator ex (apSoftN(·)) and one for the denominator 1∑
exj
(apSoftD(·)), each computed on different intervals. The
polynomial approximation computation is detailed in Protocol 6. To avoid an explosion of the exponential values in the softmax, a vector
〈m〉 that contains the approximated max (apMax(·)) value of each column of 〈U〉 is subtracted from all input values, i.e., from each 〈U [λ,:]〉
with λ=0,...,|cl|. Similar to softmax, the approximation of the max function requires two CAs, and is detailed in Appendix C.
Protocol 3 Activation Function σ(·).
Func. σ(〈u〉or 〈U〉,t) returns the activated 〈σ(u)〉 or 〈σ(U)〉
1: if t is Linear then 〈σ(u)〉=〈u〉
2: else if t is Logistic then
3: 〈σ(u)〉=apSigmoid(u)
4: else if t is Multinomial, input is a matrix 〈Uc×|cl|〉 then
5: 〈m〉=apMax(〈U〉)
6: for λ ∈ cl:
7: 〈U ′[λ,·]〉=〈U [λ,·]〉−〈m〉
8: 〈σ(U [λ,·])〉=M(apSoftN(〈U ′[λ,·]〉),apSoftD(〈U ′[λ,·]〉))
COMBINE. The MAP outputs of each DPi, i.e., 〈w(i,j)〉, are homomorphically combined ascending a tree structure, such that each DPi
aggregates its encrypted updated local weights with those of its children and sends the result to its parent. In this case, the combination
function C(·) is the homomorphic addition operation. At the end of this phase, the DP at the root of the tree DPR obtains the encrypted
combined weights 〈w(·,j)〉.
REDUCE.DPR updates the encrypted global weights 〈w(·,j)G 〉, as shown in Protocol 4. More precisely, it computes Equation 2 by using the
encrypted sum of the DPs’ updated local weights 〈w(·,j)〉 (obtained from COMBINE), the previous global weights 〈w(·,j−1)G 〉, the pre-defined
elastic rate ρ and the learning rate α. After g iterations of the MAP, COMBINE, and REDUCE, DPR obtains the encrypted global model
〈w(·,g)G 〉 and broadcasts it to the rest of the DPs.
Protocol 4 REDUCE.
DPR computes 〈w(·,j)G 〉←Red(〈w(·,j−1)G 〉,〈w(·,j)〉,ρ,α)
1: 〈w(·,j)G 〉=(1−αρ|S|)〈w(·,j−1)G 〉+αρ〈w(·,j)〉
2) PREDICTION: The querier’s input data (X′,·) is encrypted with the collective public key pk. Then, 〈X′〉pk is multiplied with the
weights of the trained model 〈w(·,g)G 〉 and processed through the activation function σ(·) to obtain the encrypted prediction values 〈y′〉 (one
prediction per row ofX′). The prediction results encrypted under pk are then collectively switched by the DPs to the querier public key
pk′ using DKeySwitch(·), so that only the querier can decrypt 〈y′pk′〉.
Protocol 5 PREDICTION.
DPR gets 〈X′n′×c〉 from Querier and computes 〈y′n′〉 using 〈w(·,g)G 〉
1: 〈y′[p]〉=σ(M(〈X′[p,·]〉,〈w(·,g)G 〉)), for p=0,...,n′
2: 〈y′〉pk′=DKeySwitch(〈y′〉,pk′,sk)
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V. SYSTEM OPERATIONS & OPTIMIZATIONS
We describe how SPINDLE relies on the properties of the distributed version of CKKS to efficiently tackle the problem of privacy-preserving
distributed learning. We first describe how we optimize the protocols of Section IV-B by choosing when to execute cryptographic operations
such as rescaling and (distributed) bootstrapping. Then, we discuss how to efficiently perform the MAP protocol that involves a sequence
of vector-matrix-multiplications and the evaluation of the activation function, in the encrypted domain.
A. Cryptographic Operations
We recall that the homomorphic addition of ciphertexts {〈v〉,τ,∆} results in a ciphertext of the same scale ∆ and level τ , whereas a
product multiplies the scales (Section IV-A). In the ciphertext space, all operations at level τ are executed modulo Qτ and a ciphertext
has to be rescaled when ∆ grows too much. During Rescale(·), a ciphertext is divided by qτ , and subsequent operations are executed
at level τ−1. When τb levels are consumed, with τb <L depending on the security parameters, the ciphertext has to be bootstrapped.
If two ciphertexts are multiplied, the resulting ciphertext grows in the number of polynomial components, and it has to be relinearized
(Relin(·)). In summary, any multiplication involving ciphertext(s) incurs the execution of other cryptographic operations and hence increases
SPINDLE’s computation overhead. This overhead can rapidly grow when the same ciphertext is involved in sequential operations, i.e.,
when the operations’ multiplicative depth is high. As we will describe in Section VIII, SPINDLE relies on the Lattigo [72] lattice-based
cryptographic library, where a ciphertext addition or multiplication requires a few ms, while Rescale(·), Relin(·), and DBootstrap(·), are
1-order, 2-orders, and 1.5-orders of magnitude slower than the addition, respectively. These operations can be computationally heavy, and
their execution in the protocols should be optimized. We remark that we avoid the use of the centralized traditional bootstrapping, as it would
require a much more conservative parameterization for the same security level, resulting in higher computational overheads (see Section VIII).
Lazy Rescaling. To maintain the precision of the encrypted values and for efficiency, we only rescale a ciphertext {〈v〉,τ,∆} when ∆ is
close to qτ . Hence, we only perform a ReScale(·) if this condition is met, after a series of consecutive operations.
Relinearization. Letting the ciphertext grow after every multiplication would add to the subsequent operations an overhead that is higher than
the relinearization, so to maintain the ciphertext size and degree constant, a Relin(·) operation is performed after each ciphertext-ciphertext
multiplication. We here note that a Relin(·) operation can be deferred if doing so incurs in a lower computational complexity (e.g., if additions
performed after the ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications reduce the number of ciphertexts to relinearize).
Bootstrapping. In the protocols of Section IV-B, we observe that the data providers’ local weights and the model global weights (〈w〉 and
〈wG〉, resp.) are the only persistent ciphertexts over multiple computations and iterations. They are therefore the only ciphertexts that need
to be bootstrapped and we consider two approaches for this. With (a) Local bootstrap (LB), each data provider (DP) bootstraps (calling
a DBootstrap(·) protocol) its local weights every time they reach level τb during the MAP local iterations and before the COMBINE. As a
result, the global weights are always combined with fresh encryptions of the local weights and only need to be bootstrapped after multiple
REDUCE. Indeed, REDUCE involves a multiplication by a constant and therefore a Rescale(·). With (b) Global bootstrap (GB), we leverage
the interdependency between the local and global weights, and we bootstrap only the global weights and assign them directly to the local
weights. The bootstrapping is performed on the global weights during REDUCE. Thus, we modify TRAINING so that MAP operates on the
(bootstrapped) global weights, i.e., 〈w(i,j−1)〉=〈wG(·,j−1)〉, for aDPi at global iteration j. Following this approach, the number of bootstrap
operations is reduced, with respect to the local approach, because it is performed only by one DP and only depends on the number of global
iterations. However, it modifies the learning method, and it offers less flexibility, as the number of local iterations in MAP is constrained by the
number of ciphertext multiplications required in each iteration and by the available ciphertext levels. In our experiments (Section VIII-B), we
observed that the effect on the trained model’s accuracy depends mainly on the data and that in most cases, enabling DPs to perform more local
iterations (LB) between two global updates yields a better accuracy. Even though LB incurs at least |S|more executions of the DBootstrap(·),
the DPs execute them in parallel and thus amortize the overhead on SPINDLE’s execution time. However, if the training of a dataset requires
frequent global updates, then GB should be preferred, see Section VIII-B. Taking into account these cryptographic transformations and the
strategy to optimize their use in SPINDLE, we explain now how to optimize the required number of ciphertext operations.
B. MAP Vector-matrix Multiplications
As described in Section IV-A, each CKKS ciphertext encrypts (or packs) a vector of values, e.g., 8,192 elements if the ring dimension
isN = 214. This packing enables us to simultaneously perform operations on all the vector values, by using a Single Instruction Multiple
Data (SIMD) approach for parallelization. To execute computations among values stored in different slots of the same ciphertext, e.g., an
inner sum, we rely on ciphertext rotations, which have a computation cost similar to a relinearization (Relin(·)). Recall that for the execution
of stochastic gradient descent, each local iteration in MAP involves two sequential multiplications between encrypted vectors and cleartext
matrices (Protocol 2, lines 4 and 5). As such, packing is useful to reduce the number of vector multiplications and rotations needed to perform
these operations. To this end, SPINDLE integrates two packing approaches and automatically selects the most appropriate approach at each
DP during the training. We now describe these two approaches and how to choose between them depending on the settings, i.e., the learning
parameters, the number of features, and the DP computation capabilities. Figure 2 depicts SPINDLE’s packing approaches for a toy example
of the computation of 〈u〉 (Protocol 2, line 4) whose result is activated (i.e., σ(〈u〉)) before used in the computation of 〈v〉 (Protocol 2, line
5), for a setting with c=b=4. For clarity, we assume that a vector of c (number of features) or b (batch size) elements can be encoded in
one ciphertext (or plaintext), i.e., max(c,b)≤N/2.
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P2(x) returns the next power of 2 bigger than x.
Row-Based Approach (RBA). This approach was proposed by Kim et al. [59]. The input matrices (B and αBT ) are packed row-wise and
multiple rows are packed in one plaintext ((a) in upper part of Figure 2), i.e., the number of plaintexts required to encode the input matrix is
dc·b·2N e. Each plaintext is then multiplied with a ciphertext containing the replicated weights’ vector (b), such that the number of weights vectors
is equal to the number of rows inB. To obtain the results of the dot products between each weights vector and row ofB, a partial inner sum is
performed by adding the resulting ciphertext with rotated versions of itself (c). The values in-between the dot product results are eliminated (i.e.,
masking) through a multiplication with a binary vector (d), and the dot product results are duplicated in the ciphertext (e) such that it can be ac-
tivated (σ(·)) and directly used for the multiplication withαXT (f). The result is then rotated and added to itself (g) such that it can be masked
(h) to obtain 〈v〉. As shown in Figure 2, the total number of vector multiplications is dc·b·2N e·4, whereas the number of ciphertext-rotations is
dc·b·2N e·2·(log(b)+log(c)). This approach has a multiplicative depth of am+4, where am denotes the depth of the activation function σ(·).
Diagonal Approach (DA). This approach was presented by Halevi and Shoup [49] as an optimized homomorphic vector-matrix-
multiplication evaluation. It optimizes the number of ciphertext rotations by transforming the input plaintext matrix B. In particular,
B is diagonalized and each line is rotated ((a′) in lower part of Figure 2) so that they can be independently multiplied with the (rotated)
weights vector (b′). The resulting ciphertexts are aggregated and rotated to obtain 〈u〉 (c′), and a similar approach is used to compute
〈v〉 after the activation. As shown in Figure 2, DA only executes 2 · ((N1 − 1) + (N2 − 1)) rotations on the encrypted vector, with
N1 =P
2(max(c,b))/N2 and N2 = b
√
P2(max(c,b))c, where P2(x) returns the next power of 2 bigger than x. This approach involves
N1 ·N2 plaintext-ciphertext multiplications on independent ciphertexts and does not require any masking, which results in a multiplicative
depth of am+2. Therefore, this approach consumes fewer levels than RBA.
In both approaches, the number of rotations and multiplications depends on the batch size b and the number of features c. We remark
that DA almost always requires more multiplications than RBA, and uses more rotations after a certain c (e.g., if b= 8, the break-even
happens at c=64). However, as DA is embarrassingly parallelizable for both multiplications and rotations (with rotations being the most
time-consuming operations), the computations can be amortized on multiple threads. Taking this into account, SPINDLE automatically
chooses the best approach at each DP based on c, b, and the number of available threads. We analyze these tradeoffs in Section VIII.
C. Optimized Activation Function
As described in Section IV-B, to enable their execution under FHE, we approximate the sigmoid (apSigmoid(·)) and softmax (apMax(·),
apSoftN(·), and apSoftD(·)) activation functions with least-squares and Chebyshev polynomial approximations (PA), respectively. Their
evaluation requires multiple ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications and must be optimized to minimize the number of products and the used
levels. To this end, we adapt the optimized baby-step giant-step algorithm introduced by Han and Ki [50], that enables the minimum-
complexity computation of a degree-d approximation with a multiplicative depth of dlog(d)e for d≤7, and with depth dlog(d)+1e otherwise
(Protocol 6). The coefficients of the PA are generated using the definition of the function to be approximated, the interval and the degree.
Then, the approximation function AF(·) takes the encrypted vector 〈u〉, the degree d and the coefficients r of the PA, and outputs 〈a〉,
the encrypted PA evaluation of 〈u〉. Protocol 6 inductively computes the (element-wise) exponentiation of the encrypted input vector 〈u〉:
〈u1〉,〈u2〉,...,〈u2k−1〉,〈u2k〉,〈u2k+1〉,...,〈u2ω−1〉 (Protocol 6, line 2), where ω is the smallest value satisfying 2ω>d(p(〈u〉)) and k=bω/2c.
Then, it recursively evaluates p(〈u〉)=∑i=1,2,3...,dri〈ui〉=〈u2ω−1〉q(〈u〉)+R(〈u〉) (Protocol 6, line 3). Note that p(·), q(·), andR(·) are
functions of 〈u〉 and of the approximation coefficients r, q(·) is the quotient of the division of the actual activation function p(·) by 〈u2ω−1〉,
andR(·) is the remainder of the division. d(x) is a function that outputs the degree of x. For a degree-5 approximation of the sigmoid, we
have 〈p(u)〉= 〈u4〉q(〈u〉)+R(〈u〉), where q(〈u〉) =r[5]〈u〉 and R(〈u〉) =r[0]+r[1]〈u〉+r[3]〈u3〉. The algorithm is then recursively
executed on q(〈u〉) andR(〈u〉) (Protocol 6, line 6).
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Protocol 6 Encrypted Polynomial Approx. Evaluation AF(·).
Func. AF(〈u〉,d,r) outputs 〈a〉 the evaluated polynomial approx. of 〈u〉
1: Choose the smallest ω such that 2ω>d and define k=bω/2c
2: Pre-compute {ui}= 〈u1〉,〈u2〉,...,〈u2k-1〉,〈u2k〉,〈u2k+1〉,...,〈u2ω-1〉
inductively and call paRecu(r,d,{ui})
3: Function paRecu(r,d,{ui}):
4: Choose the smallest ω such that 2ω>d
5: Find polynomials q(〈u〉) andR(〈u〉) with 〈a〉=
〈u2ω−1〉q(〈u〉)+R(〈u〉) such that 〈a〉=∑i=1,2,..,dr[i]〈ui〉
6: If d(q),d(R)≤2 :
Evaluate q(〈u〉)=paRecu(r,d=d(q),{ui})
andR(〈u〉)=paRecu(r,d=d(R),{ui})
7: Else Return 〈a〉
VI. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
We discuss how to parameterize SPINDLE by taking into account the interdependencies between the input data, and the learning and
cryptographic parameters. We also describe how SPINDLE’s operations are affected when (some of) the data providers do not have access
to plaintext data and directly operate on encrypted data. This can be the case, for example, when a data owner outsources data storage and
computation to an untrusted cloud provider, which then acts as a DP. Finally, we explain how the trained model can be released, if it is not
kept secret, to be used for privacy-preserving prediction.
Parameter Selection. SPINDLE relies on the configuration of (a) cryptographic parameters, that determine its security level, and (b) learning
parameters, that affect the accuracy of the training and evaluation of the models. Both are tightly linked, and we capture these relations in
a graph-based model, displayed in Figure 3, where vertices and edges represent the parameters and their interdependence, respectively. For
simplicity, we present a directed graph that depicts our empirical method for choosing the parameters (see Appendix D, Table I for notation
symbols). We highlight that the corresponding non-directed graph is more generic and simply captures the main relations among the parameters.
We observe two main clusters: the cryptographic parameters on the upper part of the graph (dotted circles), and the learning parameters
(circles) on the lower one. The input data and their intrinsic characteristics, i.e., the number of features c or precision (bits of precision required
to represent the data), are connected with both clusters, which are also interconnected through the plaintext scale ∆. As such, there are various
ways to configure the overall system parameters. In our case, we decide to first chooseN (ciphertext polynomial degree), such that at least c
Xnxc Δ" #$, & '(, ) *+ ,, -.[0! , ,!]
Fig. 3: System Parameters Graph. Circles and dotted circles represent learning and cryptographic parameters, respectively.
elements can be packed in one ciphertext.Q (ciphertext modulus) and η (fresh encryption noise) are then fixed to ensure a sufficient level of
security (e.g., 128-bits) following the accepted parameterization from the homomorphic encryption standard whitepaper [9]. The scale ∆ is
configured to provide enough precision for the input dataX, andmc (moduli chain) andL (number of levels) are set accordingly. The intervals
[ai,gi] used for the approximations of the activation functions are defined according toX. The approximation degreesd are then set depending
on these intervals and the available number of levels L. The remaining learning parameters (α, ρ, b, g, m) are agreed upon by the data
providers based on their observation of their part of the dataset. We remark that the minimum values for the learning rateα and elastic rate ρ are
limited by the scale ∆, and if they are too small the system might not have enough precision to handle their multiplication with the input data.
Data Outsourcing. SPINDLE’s protocols (Section IV-B) work seamlessly with data providers (DPs) that have their input dataX in cleartext,
and with DPs that obtain data 〈X〉pk encrypted under the public collective key from their respective data owners. As such, SPINDLE enables
data storage and computation outsourcing to untrusted cloud providers that offer strong computation capabilities and that are always available.
It distributes the workload among multiple data providers and is still able to rely on efficient multiparty homomorphic encryption operations,
e.g., DBootstrap(·). We assume that PREPARE has been performed by the data owners who generate the collective public key, agree on the
parameters and outsource their encrypted and pre-formatted data, e.g.,XT is already computed. Then, the remaining TRAINING phases
are executed by the entities that obtain the outsourced data. However, we note that operating on encrypted input data impacts the complexity
of MAP, as all the multiplication operations (Protocol 2) would happen between ciphertexts, and would therefore require a relinearization
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operation (Relin(·)). This is in contrast with the case of cleartext data at their respective DPs, where ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications
only occur during the computation of the activation function, with the preceding operations being cleartext-ciphertext multiplications.
Model Release. By default, the trained model in SPINDLE is kept secret from any entity and still enables privacy-preserving predictions on
(private) evaluation data input by the querier (offering end-to-end model confidentiality). Nonetheless, if required by the application setting,
SPINDLE can enable the revelation of the trained model to the querier or a set of entities. This is achieved by performing a DKeySwitch(·).
Thus, the data providers can all collaborate to obliviously re-encrypt the trained model weights (which are encrypted under their collective
key) with a different public key, e.g., the querier’s key. Alternatively, the data providers can collectively decrypt (DDec(·)) the trained model
and publicly release it. In such cases, model confidentiality is only assured until the end of the training.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We enunciate the security of SPINDLE as the following lemma:
Lemma 1. SPINDLE achieves privacy-preserving training and evaluation of generalized linear models by satisfying Data Confidentiality
and Model Confidentiality (as defined in Section III-A), if at least one data provider is honest-but-curious (or honest).
We sketch the proof by relying on the real/ideal simulation paradigm [67] and show that a computationally-bounded adversary that controls
up to (|S|−1)-out-of-|S| DPs cannot distinguish a “real” world experiment, in which the adversary is given actual data (sent by honest
DP(s)), and an “ideal” world experiment, in which the adversary is given data (e.g., random) generated by a simulator. In PREPARE and MAP,
the data providers (DPs) locally compute on their data and only exchange encrypted information with each other to perform DBootstrap(·).
Mouchet et al. [78] prove that their distributed protocols, i.e., Collective Encryption-Key Generation and Collective Relinearization-Key
Generation (denoted by DKeyGen(·) in our work), Collective Key Switching (DKeySwitch(·) and DDec(·)), and Collective Bootstrapping
(DBootstrap(·)) are secure under the simulator paradigm. They show that the distribution of the cryptoscheme preserves its security in the
Anytrust model [106], as long as the decisional-RLWE problem is hard. Their proofs, which are constructed using the BFV scheme, generalize
to our adaptation of their protocols to CKKS, as they preserve the same computational assumptions, and the security of CKKS is based on
the same hard problem as BFV. In COMBINE, the DPs’ MAP outputs, encrypted under the public collective key, are aggregated. These outputs
are the encrypted results of multiple local iterations in which elements derived from eachDPi’s local private data (X(i),y(i)) are combined
with its encrypted local model 〈w(i,·)〉 and the current encrypted global model 〈wG〉. This result is re-randomized (i.e., added to a fresh
encryption of 0) to ensure that the outputs of two consecutive MAP (i.e., the inputs to COMBINE) do not leak any information about the DPs’
data. Due to the cryptoscheme’s semantic security, the encryptions are indistinguishable from random encryptions (they can be simulated)
and cannot be decrypted unless all DPs collude, which would contradict the Anytrust assumption. In REDUCE, the global model is updated by
combining encrypted data and a DBootstrap(·) is executed. The same arguments as for MAP apply. In PREDICTION, the evaluation data and
the model are encrypted under the public collective key (hence can be simulated) and cannot be decrypted. The predictions y′ are collectively
switched to the querier’s public key by the DKeyswitch(·) operation, whose security is proven by Mouchet et al. [78].
We remark that if the adversary controls all but one DPs (and the querier), it can craft their inputs (e.g., to be 0) in order to obtain
information about the remaining (victim) DP. However, even in this case, the adversary would obtain only the output of SPINDLE’s ideal
functionality, i.e., the predictions y′, that only depend on the victim’s trained model. This leakage can be partially mitigated by the use of
differential privacy as described in Appendix A. There, we also discuss how this mechanism mitigates membership inference attacks [96]
and we describe how SPINDLE can be extended to ensure that the DPs perform correct computations and that they input correct data in
the process. Finally, we note that by design, SPINDLE thwarts active attacks on federated learning [52] and model inversion attacks [39],
as intermediate and final model weights are never revealed during TRAINING.
VIII. SYSTEM EVALUATION
We first analyze the theoretical complexity of SPINDLE before moving to the empirical evaluation of its prototype.
A. Theoretical Analysis
We summarize SPINDLE’s complexity in Table 4a and discuss our main observations.
Communication Complexity. We observe that SPINDLE’s communication complexity mainly depends on the number of data providers |S|,
iterations (g,m) and the size |ct| of the ciphertexts. |ct| here represents the maximum size of a ciphertext, i.e., the size of a fresh ciphertext
at level L. For MAP, assuming that max(c,b)<N/2, the number of ciphertexts #ct that encrypt the weights is 1 for the diagonal approach
(DA) and dc·b·2N e for the row-based approach (RBA). The local bootstrap (LB) incurs a communication overhead (a factor |S|) higher than
the global approach (GB), as the former is executed by each data provider. The number of DBootstrap(·) (f(g) for GB and f(g,m) for LB)
depends on the cryptographic parameters (i.e., how many local iterations can be executed in L levels). In COMBINE, each DP, except the
root oneDPR, sends one ciphertext per global iteration. The same happens for REDUCE, except that a DBootstrap(·) is performed in some
iterations. Finally, the PREDICTION requires the exchange of one ciphertext between a DP and the querier and one DKeySwitch(·) operation,
i.e., 2 ciphertexts are sent per DP.
Computation Complexity. SPINDLE’s most intensive computational part is MAP; its complexity depends mainly on the number of: DPs |S|,
features c, records n, as well as the batch size b; n determines the number of global g and localm iterations. The DA packing approach incurs
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(a) Theoretical Analysis.
Dataset Vers. SP,↵, ⇢,b g,m {[ai,gi],di} Acc./MSE F1/MAE T. P.
CalCOFI
[812,174x2]
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 10 1, , 1300
 , 10 1, 10 2, 1300
2, 10 1, 10 2, 1300
 
50, 1
50, 1
 
 
 
15.157, [408]
17.679
17.938
3.1, [19.67]
3.45
3.62
 
6.71
65.31
 
2 · 10 4
0.23
PIMA
[768x8]
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 10 2, , 50
 , 10 2, 10 2, 50
2, 10 2, 10 2, 50
 
1, 30
1, 30
 
 
[±7], 3
0.784, [0.720]
0.781
0.780
0.680, [0.604]
0.679
0.677
 
0.038
11.28
 
9 · 10 5
0.18
BCW
[699x9]
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 10 1, , 20
 , 10 1, 10 1, 20
2, 10 1, 10 1, 20
 
1, 3
1, 3
 
 
[±1], 3
0.962, [0.922]
0.962
0.962
0.947, [0.877]
0.942
0.944
 
0.034
3.25
 
5 · 10 5
0.16
ESR
[11,500x90]
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 6 3, , 10
 , 6 3, 10 1, 10
2, 6 3, 10 1, 10
 
92, 1
92, 1
 
 
[±15], 5
0.842, [0.838]
0.840
0.839
0.462, [0.396]
0.460
0.456
 
2.89
53.27
 
8 · 10 5
0.35
MNIST
[70,000 x
784] (multi.)
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 10 4, , 1024
 , 10 4, 10 1, 1024
1,10 4, 10 1, 1024
 
3, 6
3, 6
 
 
SM:[ 30, 4], 15/[1, 40], 19
M:[±15], 15/[1, 40], 15
0.873, [0.873]
0.865
0.8617
0.871, [0.832]
0.863
0.86
 
43.95
558
 
0.49
4.33
MNIST
[70,000 x
784] (1 vs. a)
CCS, [IT]
DNP
SPINDLE
 , 10 4, , 1024
 , 10 4, 10 1, 1024
1,10 4, 10 1, 1024
 
3, 6
3, 6
 
 
[±15], 15
0.856, [0.827]
0.853
0.852
0.859, [0.822]
0.858
0.850
 
43.98
187.8
 
0.49
4.33
1
(b) Baseline Comparison with K-fold=5. Time to train (T.) and predict (P.) is in seconds.
Fig. 4: SPINDLE’s Evaluation.
a higher computation complexity (with notably more plaintext-ciphertext multiplications and rescaling (M), and rotations (R)) but, as shown
in Section VIII-B, it is embarrassingly parallel, i.e., operations can be amortized by a factorN1·N2 (defined in Section V-B) depending on the
available threads. In COMBINE, each DP performs only additions (A) and in REDUCE,DPR performs light operations (multiplications with
plaintext and rescaling (M) and additions) and a DBootstrap(·) (equivalent to an encryption (E) and a decryption (D) for each DP) in some
iterations, depending on the settings. It is worth noting that multiple predictions can be performed in parallel, as the querier input data are
packed in one ciphertext that is processed by one DP, before all DPs collaborate in DKeySwitch(·), which is equivalent to one addition for each
DP. The activation function is the only operation that requires ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications, and thus relinearizations and rescaling (M’).
B. Empirical Evaluation
We implemented SPINDLE in Go [2]. Our implementation builds on top of Lattigo [72], an open-source Go library for lattice-based
cryptography, and Onet [1], an open-source Go library for building decentralized systems. The communication between data providers (DPs)
is done through TCP with secure channels (using TLS). We evaluate our prototype on an emulated realistic network, with a bandwidth of
100Mbps and 20ms communication delay between every two nodes, using Mininet [73]. We deploy SPINDLE on 5 Linux machines with Intel
Xeon E5-2680 v3 CPUs running at 2.5GHz with 24 threads on 12 cores and 256 Giga Bytes RAM, on which we evenly distribute the DPs.
Datasets. For linear regression, we use the CalCOFI dataset (with n=812,174 records and c=2 features) [20]. It contains oceanographic
data (e.g., salinity) that can be used to predict the water temperature. For logistic regression, we use three different datasets: (a) the Breast
Cancer Wisconsin dataset (BCW, n= 699, c= 9) [11] contains patients’ data that is employed to predict the presence of a breast cancer,
(b) the PIMA dataset (n= 768, c= 8) [87] contains medical observations collected from an Indian community, that can be used to predict
the presence of diabetes, and (c) the Epileptic Seizure Recognition dataset (ESR, n = 11,500, c = 179) [37] contains patients’ data that
can be used to predict a seizure. For multinomial regression, we test SPINDLE on the MNIST dataset (n= 70,000, c= 784) [64], where
the goal is to identify single-digits out of grey-scale images. We rely on these datasets to compare SPINDLE with various baselines. Each
experiment is performed 5x, and in each iteration the dataset is evenly and randomly distributed among the DPs using 5-fold cross-validation.
Finally, the system’s scalability is tested on randomly generated (larger) datasets.
Configuration&Parameterization.We employ two sets of security parameters (SP), both ensuring 128-bit level of security: SP1: (N = 214,
Q= 2438, η=3.2, number of levels L= 9, scale ∆ = 234, degree of the approximated activation function d= 5) and SP2: (N = 213,Q=
2218, η=3.2,L= 6, ∆ = 230, d= 3). SP2 is sufficient for linear regression and for specific logistic regression models that accept a low-degree
d approximation. To account for a wider-range of solutions, we rely on SP1, unless otherwise stated. We employ the local bootstrap approach
for all our experiments and for all datasets in baseline comparison except ESR and CalCOFI, as in most cases, doing multiple m local
iterations between two global iterations yields a better accuracy. With our default parameters and global bootstrap, the maximumm is 2, and
its impact on the accuracy depends on the dataset. Unless otherwise stated, we employ the diagonal approach (DA) for packing; we compare
it with the row-based approach (RBA) in Figure 4a. In all our experiments, we consider SPINDLE’s total training execution time to perform a
regression (including communication) without PREPARE. The reason is that the collective key generation DKeyGen(·) is executed only once at
the system setup by the set of DPs; the other PREPARE computations that are executed for each training request are mainly plaintext operations.
As an example, the complete PREPARE takes 16.5s for a dataset of 40,000 samples distributed among 4 DPs. In the baseline comparison,
we consider the training time on the complete dataset and use the training batch size b as the number of data samples input for the prediction.
MAP accounts for up to 99.5% of SPINDLE’s execution time. As shown in Section V, the DPs perform most of the computations in MAP.
Indeed, MAP is the only step with multiple local iterations, and each of them contains two matrix-vector multiplications, which span most (up
to 97%) of its execution time. The remaining time is shared by the computation of the activation function and the collective bootstrapping.
Baseline Comparison. To evaluate SPINDLE, we compare its performance, i.e., execution time and accuracy against an ideal baseline, i.e.,
a non-privacy-preserving centralized cleartext solution (CCS) where a DP obtains the full dataset and trains the model on it. Moreover,
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we compare SPINDLE with a distributed non-privacy-preserving (DNP) solution, to show that the cryptographic schemes for approximate
homomorphic encryption and the approximation of the activation function introduce minimal performance degradation. Finally, to demonstrate
the benefit of distributed learning approaches, we compare SPINDLE’s accuracy with a case where one DP independently trains a model
only on its local part of the distributed dataset (Independent Training, IT).
Figure 4b shows SPINDLE’s accuracy (Acc.) (resp., Mean Squared Error, MSE) and F1-score (F1) (resp., Mean Average Error, MAE)
for logistic and multinomial (resp., linear) regressions, achieved on the above datasets when they are split among 10 DPs. We observe that
SPINDLE’s accuracy loss is very low, up to 0.8%, with respect to a non-private centralized (CCS) solution where the model is trained on the
full dataset (using standard SGD) with a standard Python library [4]. For instance, on ESR we obtain 84.2% accuracy in CCS and 83.9% with
SPINDLE. Moreover, we note that this loss is mainly due to the data not being centralized, as SPINDLE consistently achieves almost the same
accuracy as the decentralized non-private (DNP) equivalent solution, for which the collective model is trained on cleartext parameters and with
the original activation functions. SPINDLE’s total training time (column T. in Figure 4b) is between only one and 2 orders of magnitude higher
than DNP, as the costly operations on encrypted data are partially amortized by SIMD operations enabled by the packing of multiple values in
one ciphertext. For instance, the training on the ESR dataset takes almost 3 seconds in DNP and 53.27 seconds in SPINDLE. We do not report
the time for the centralized training (CCS and IT), as the settings are too different to be comparable in a fair way. We also remark that when a
DP independently trains on its part of the dataset (IT), i.e., with 1/10-th of the data, the achieved accuracy is on average smaller than the one
achieved on the entire distributed dataset. SPINDLE’s prediction (P.) on 10 data samples of 90 features (ESR dataset) requires only 0.35 seconds
by packing the input data in the ciphertexts and executing the computations in parallel. Finally, we observe that even though multinomial
regression requires polynomial approximations of higher degree, i.e., 15 for softmax’s (SM) nominator, 19 for its denominator, and 15 for the
max function (M), its training on 70,000 records of 784 features (MNIST) is executed in 558 seconds (column T. in Figure 4b). This time can be
reduced to 187.8 seconds by performing 10 logistic regressions in parallel, one per label class (one-vs-all), at the cost of a 1% loss in accuracy.
Scalability. We study how SPINDLE’s execution time evolves when increasing the number of: features (c), data providers (|S|), and dataset
samples (n). By default, we set |S|= 5, each DP having 5,120 data records (synthetically generated) with c= 32 features; we use a batch
size b= 256, with g=5 global iterations, andm=20 local iterations in MAP. When comparing different approaches, we ensure that the
number of times that the dataset is fully processed is constant, and we set the learning parameters accordingly. Figure 5a displays SPINDLE’s
execution time with an increasing number of features c and shows that it scales better than linearly, in any of the used approaches. In this
setting, we also study the influence of the multi-threading, the differences between the two packing approaches (Section V-B) and the
impact of having encrypted input data (Section VI). When the computations are single-threaded, the row-based approach (RBA) is more
efficient than the diagonal approach (DA) up to c=128 features, as RBA incurs fewer multiplications and rotations than DA. In contrast,
the diagonal approach (DA) execution time in one or multiple threads is almost constant up to c=256 features (with a batch size b=256),
as its complexity depends mainly on max(c,b) (Section V-B). However, the DA is embarrassingly parallelizable, and it is always faster when
the computations are executed on 24 threads. As an example, on multiple threads and for 256 features, DA yields an execution time of 165s
against 330s for RBA, and 365s when the input data are encrypted and using RBA. For both approaches, the parallelization is efficient up to
c=28, where the maximum thread-utilisation is reached. Afterwards, both approaches scale linearly. When the data providers have encrypted
input data (RBA-E), the execution time increases by 7% with respect to RBA.
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Fig. 5: SPINDLE’s Scalability.
Figure 5b.i shows that when the number of DPs |S| increases and each DP has a fixed amount of data, SPINDLE’s execution time is
constant. This means that SPINDLE scales independently of |S|. In Figure 5b.ii, where |S| increases but the total amount of data remains
constant, SPINDLE’s execution time decreases linearly, as the workload is efficiently distributed among the DPs. In Figure 5b.iii, when |S|
is constant and the size of the DPs’ datasets increases, SPINDLE’s execution time increases linearly with the amount of data. If the batch size
can be increased when the data providers have more records, then SPINDLE’s execution time can be further reduced. In summary, SPINDLE
scales independently of the number of data providers, and linearly with the DPs’ dataset size. It is able to train models with a high number
of features and thus remains practical for real-world sized datasets.
Communication. Our benchmarks show that if we halve the available bandwidth and double the communication delay, the communication
time increases by a factor of 2. In our default scenario with 5 DPs, 5 global iterations and 20 local iterations and using the security parameters
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Logistic 
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training
CES malicious H.b.C. H.b.C. yes yes yes NA linear linear similar (1) 25.6k, 212, - 12k 14k Not support
Drynx [41] malicious malicious malicious partial no yes linear quadra. alm. indep. lower (1) 25.6k, 212, 5 Not pract.Not pract. Not support
Prio [28] malicious malicious H.b.C. partial no NA linear quadra. alm. indep. lower (1) 25.6k, 212, 5 Not pract. NA Not support
Helen [112] malicious H.b.C. malicious yes no no quadra. quadra. alm. indep. similar
(2) 400k,100,4
(3) 400k,10,10
(4) 4M, 90, 4
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Fig. 6: Comparison with existing solutions. Cond. stands for condition, |S|, c are the nbr. of DPs and features, ni the size of eachDPi local dataset. Timings
for training are in seconds.H.b.C stands for honest-but-curious, NA for does not apply and * means that SPINDLE can be extended to support malicious.
SP1, the size of a ciphertext is 2.6MB and the total communication is 1,144MB for a synthetic distributed dataset, (e.g., of float values
encoded on 64bits), of up to 54 Giga Bytes.
Comparison with State-of-the-art Privacy-Preserving Solutions. In Figure 6, we perform a qualitative and quantitative comparison of
SPINDLE with existing works. We consider a generic privacy-preserving centralized encrypted solution (CES), two distributed solutions,
Drynx [41] and Prio [28], which respectively rely on additive HE and secret sharing, and Helen [114], a solution that employs a different
distributed approach, the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) proposed by Boyd et al. [19], to train regularized linear
models. CES represents a centralized solution, similar to existing works [61], [59], [21], in which one DP outsources its encrypted data
to a server that trains and evaluates a model. For a fair comparison, we estimate the execution time (without communication) of a generic
centralized (outsourced) solution (CES) relying on the non-multiparty CKKS scheme with security parameters that enable packing of the
same number of values in one ciphertext. We use as a reference one of the most recent works on bootstrapping by Han and Dohyeong
[50]. They propose a solution that provides around 108 bits of security (and not 128 bits due to recent attacks [109], [24]) and executes
a bootstrapping in CKKS in 26 seconds with ciphertexts that can encrypt 213 values, corresponding to SP1, and about 20 seconds for SP2.
Therefore, CES’s execution time is always higher ((1) in Table 6) than SPINDLE, as the server has to process the entire dataset, and the
centralized bootstrapping operation is up to two orders of magnitudes slower than DBootstrap(·) (with 5 DPs). In both Prio and Drynx, the
data providers (DPs) create encodings of their data, that are aggregated under secret-sharing or HE, and the result is decrypted such that
the querier performs the SGD in cleartext. These encodings are combinations of the DPs’ input data; compared to SPINDLE, that performs
the SGD under encryption, they reveal more information to the querier than the predictions on the trained model. Moreover, the use of
encodings requires an approximation of the cost function in the GD’s input, which can reduce the model’s accuracy. In contrast, in SPINDLE,
we approximate only the activation function. Both Prio and Drynx are limited to datasets with a small number of features c, as the number of
secret-shares or ciphertexts for the data encoding increases (at least) quadratically with c. In Helen, the DPs perform the ADMM optimization
locally under a quantum-vulnerable additive HE cryptoscheme, and combine their results under secret-sharing. ADMM is less widespread
than SGD, it is primarly designed for linear models and does not provide the same stability and convergence guarantees than the cooperative
gradient descent [112], [104], [105], [18], for which convergence can be derived from SGD. In Helen, the DPs commit to their input data and
prove that they consistently use the same data during the training, thus providing computation correctness. This is also possible in SPINDLE
when the input data are encrypted, as explained in Appendix A. Helen does not consider model confidentiality or secure prediction, i.e.,
the model is simply revealed at the end of the training. Since Helen’s implementation is not available, we aim at providing an intuition on
how it quantitatively compares with SPINDLE. To this end, we used results reported in Helen [114] and performed similar experiments in
SPINDLE ((2),(3),(4) in Table 6). We highlight here that the experiment environment is different, and these results provide only an idea of
how these systems compare. For a fair comparison, we excluded the proof generation time in Helen and we notice that as SPINDLE, Helen
reported similar accuracy results as a non-secure centralized solution. We observe that SPINDLE scales better than Helen when increasing
|S|, as its execution time is almost the same in ((2) and (3)), and it also scales better with the number of features (almost 10x better in (4)).
IX. EXTENSIONS
Availability, Data Distribution & Asynchronous Learning. The training and prediction in SPINDLE can be partially executed if a subset
of data providers (DPs) becomes unresponsive. In particular, the available DPs continue the training process on their data and execute the
prediction on the obtained encrypted model. In this case, the prediction results can only be key-switched to the querier’s key (or decrypted)
if all the DPs are (back) online. Alternatively, we can rely on a threshold-encryption scheme where the DPs secret-share [94] their secret
keys. In this case, a subset of them can reconstruct the secret key of an unresponsive DP to perform the key-switching (or decryption).
Furthermore, to account for unresponsive DPs or imbalances in DPs’ response times (e.g., one DP has a larger fraction of the distributed
dataset), SPINDLE can be modified to be asynchronous [104], [105], [31]. In this case, there is not a single DP that performs REDUCE. Instead,
each DP performs MAP, broadcasts its updated weights (COMBINE) and performs the REDUCE with the updated weights broadcast from
other DPs. This solution can also be adapted to uneven data distribution across DPs, by appropriately weighing the contributions of each
DP to the global model computation in REDUCE. The asynchronous variant of the protocol also works in sparse networks where DPs share
their updates only with their neighbors, as Koloskova et al. [62] have shown that gradient descent still converges in such settings. SPINDLE is
modular and can be instantiated with the appropriate variant of the distributed algorithm depending on the use case. We experimentally tested
SPINDLE’s behavior in some of these cases and refer to the work by Wang and Joshi [104], [105] and Koloskova et al. [62] for the detailed
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accuracy studies of the cooperative training algorithms in these different settings. In our evaluation (Section VIII), in which we randomly split
the dataset among the DPs for each of the 5 experiment repetitions, we noticed that the randomly introduced difference in the distribution of
the data (features) among the DPs did not substantially affect the obtained accuracy. We experimentally observed that when the data are not
evenly distributed, e.g., using ESR dataset with 1 and 3 out of 10 DPs that have 10 times more data than the others, the accuracy remained
the same in all cases. However and as expected, to obtain similar accuracy as a centrally trained model, the label distributions of the DPs’
local datasets should be representative of the global dataset distribution. We used the BCW dataset to test the worst-case scenario in which
some DPs have only positive labels and observed that when 1 DP out of 10 has such a skewed label distribution, the accuracy of the trained
model decreases from 96% to 94.5%. The accuracy goes down to 88% and 74%, for 2 and respectively 3 DPs, having only positive labels.
Data Preparation&Quality Control.As mentioned in the previous section, the training on a distributed dataset can be optimized according
to how the data are distributed among the DPs. This information can also serve (a) to perform a collective standardization or normalization of
the dataset by sharing the required statistics, and (b) for quality control, e.g., to check that the data distribution is consistent across the DPs or
that they provide a fair amount of data samples. However, such information would reveal (leak) some properties about the DPs’ local datasets.
This leakage can be mitigated by the use of differential privacy or by relying on HE-based interactive protocols such as those proposed in
Drynx [41], that only reveal the global (aggregated) statistic. SPINDLE’s PREPARE phase can be extended to include these solutions and
it is up to the DPs to choose the configuration that achieves the required balance between privacy and performance.
Learning and Performance Optimizations. SPINDLE can integrate any optimization of the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) that can be
expressed as a polynomial, e.g., the Nesterov Accelerated SGD [81] (NASGD). These optimizations can reduce the required number of
iterations, hence further improving SPINDLE’s performance. We detail the changes required in SPINDLE to use NASGD in Appendix B.
There, we also mention how we can design and integrate a collective stop test protocol to avoid over- or under-fitting, which often happens
when the number of training iterations is pre-defined. This protocol enables the data providers to collectively decrypt the absolute difference
between the (global) weights of two subsequent (global) iterations, or a statistic derived from these values. The decrypted value is compared
to a chosen threshold to decide on the continuation of the training.
More Complex ML Models. We first remark that the extended, privacy-preserving MapReduce abstraction on which we rely to build
SPINDLE can actually capture many of existing solutions for secure distributed ML training [95], [41], [28], [114], [14], [82], [43], [75],
[13], [26]. We also remark that, whereas we rely on the widely applicable distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD), other distributed
approaches for training ML models such as ADMM [19] could also be expressed in the same abstraction. However, by reyling on SGD, we
aim at designing a system that can then be extended to other models, as SGD can be used to minimize many cost functions [63], [100], [113].
In particular, it can be extended to more complex models such as neural networks, which are usually trained using SGD [33]. However,
each SGD iteration would involve higher multiplicative depth circuits; therefore, their evaluation under encryption while achieving a good
performance would be an interesting challenge for future work.
X. CONCLUSION
By extending the MapReduce abstraction, we have proposed a generic solution to the problem of privacy-preserving distributed ML
model training and prediction. Our abstraction enables us to optimize the application of protection primitives from multiparty homomorphic
encryption in a MapReduce workflow. We have instantiated our solution in a quantum-resistant system, SPINDLE, that enables privacy-
preserving training and oblivious prediction on generalized linear models. We have shown that SPINDLE achieves accuracy comparable
to non-secure centralized solutions, and it scales independently of the number of DPs and linearly or better with the size of the DPs’ local
datasets. SPINDLE achieves better performance than existing centralized and distributed solutions by leveraging on the capabilities of the data
providers to concurrently compute on their local data and on a multiparty encryption scheme that replaces costly homomorphic operations
(e.g., bootstrapping) by collective and efficient protocols. To the best of our knowledge, SPINDLE is the first highly scalable system enabling
distributed learning across hundreds of parties and large datasets in a privacy-preserving, post-quantum, and efficient way.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY EXTENSIONS
In this appendix, we show several strategies to extend SPINDLE to achieve further security guarantees beyond model and data confidentiality,
namely, computation correctness, input validity, and differential privacy.
Computation Correctness. If the data providers have their input data encrypted with the collective public key, they can publish the transcript
of the executed computations on a public log or a distributed ledger. This allows an auditor to verify that the data providers perform the correct
computations on their data, while no information about them is leaked. As such, all their operations on the encrypted data can be verified and
the system can provide computation correctness, at the cost of requiring more complex operations, i.e., more ciphertext-ciphertext operations.
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Input Validation. The verification or validation of the data input by the data providers (DPs) is out of the scope of this paper. Nonetheless,
a possible solution to constraint the data input by the DPs is to verify the range of their input data by requiring them to generate and publish
zero knowledge proofs of range [66], [107]. This feature combined with computations’ correctness would enable our system to be fully
auditable as the data providers’ inputs could be verified to be in the expected ranges and the transcripts of their computations could also
be checked. This would highly limit the extend to which a malicious DP could interfere with SPINDLE’s process. However, we note that
this does not thwart all possible attacks, as, for example, poisoning attacks would still be possible with legitimate, i.e., in the range, input data.
Differential Privacy. SPINDLE naturally covers active attacks on federated learning [52] and model inversion attacks [39], as the intermediate
and final weights are never revealed. SPINDLE can also partially limit inference attacks, e.g., membership inference attacks [96], by limiting
the number of prediction requests on the trained model. This solution can be improved by adding noise to the prediction output to obtain
the guarantees of differential privacy. In fact, a mechanism that ensures differential privacy can be used for all the outputs of SPINDLE: on
the predictions y′ and on the trained model if this is released after the training. This would ensure that a passive adversary, e.g., trying to
infer information from the system’s outputs or an active adversary, e.g., controlling a subset of the DPs, cannot learn information, e.g., data
or local model, about a single or a subset of the DPs. To ensure differential privacy, we rely on the conceptually simple solution presented by
Froelicher et al. [40], where the data providers collectively and verifiably add noise to the result of a query. However, the choice of the privacy
parameters is not trivial and is an interesting direction for future work. Furthermore, the use of differential privacy in dynamic systems presents
serious limitations, and it is much more effective and practical to minimize the released non-encrypted information. That is the main approach
taken in SPINDLE with respect to federated learning systems where the intermediate outputs of each training iteration are always disclosed.
APPENDIX B
LEARNING OPTIMIZATION
SPINDLE’s performance can be optimized with techniques such as Nesterov accelerated SGD that reduce the number of required training
iterations, or by stopping the training when the global model has converged.
Nesterov Accelerated SGD. SPINDLE can seamlessly integrate the momentum method where the previous gradients are considered through
the update rule:w(·,·,l)=w(·,·,l−1)+v(·,·,l), where l∈{0,...,m}, v(·,·,l)=µv(·,·,l−1)−α[g(w(·,·,l);B(l))], with v being the velocity vector
and µ controlling how much the accumulated previous gradients are taken into account. For aDPi, the local update rule (during local iteration
l and global iteration j) becomesw(i,l)=w(i,l−1)+v(i,l)−αρ(w(i,l−1)−w(·,j−1)G ) and v(i,l)=µv(i,l−1)−αg(w(i,l−1)+µv(i,l−1);B(l)).
The TRAINING is executed as before, except that v, which becomes encrypted after having been combined with the encrypted local weights,
has to be bootstrapped with the weights in local bootstrap or reset to 0 at each global iteration in global bootstrap (Section V-A).
Stop Test. A pre-defined number of training iterations often leads to over- or under-fitting. We here propose multiple approaches to perform
a collective stop test protocol. All the approaches are based on the encrypted vector of the squared difference sqd between the weights
of two subsequent iterations. At the end of REDUCE, the data provider (DP) at the root of the treeDPR computes the squared difference
between the new updated global weights and the previous one. It can then: (1) collaborate with all DPs to perform DDec(·) and decrypt
the difference. Based on a specific condition, the training is stopped or not or (2) perform an inner sum of the encrypted and mask the vector
before also performing DDec(·). We remark that both approaches leak some information about the trained model. However, (2) only leaks
what can be inferred of the sum of the squared difference of the weights and could be executed only every n global iterations, for example.
APPENDIX C
APPROXIMATION OF THE MAXIMUM FUNCTION
Protocol 7 Approximation of the max function apMax(·).
〈m〉←apMax(〈U〉,[ai,gi],d)
1: 〈u′〉=∑|cl|λ=0〈U [λ,·]〉
2: for λ=1,...,|cl|: 〈U [λ,·]〉=(〈U [λ,·]〉−〈u′[λ,·]〉)
3: r←GetAFCoefficients((1/h′)e(x/h),[a1,g1],d[1]), where h,h′ are predefined constants
4: for λ=1,...,|cl|: 〈U ′′[λ,·]〉=AF(〈U [λ,·]〉,d[1],r)
5: 〈o〉=∑|cl|λ=0〈U ′′[λ,·]〉
6: r′←GetAFCoefficients({1/x},[a2,g2],d[2])
7: 〈o〉=AF(〈o〉,d[2],r′)
8: for λ=1,...,|cl|: 〈U [λ,·]〉=M(〈U [λ,·]〉,〈U ′′[λ,·]〉)
9: 〈m〉=∑|cl|λ=0(〈U [λ,·]〉,〈o〉)
We detail here the protocol (Protocol 7) on which we rely to compute the approximation of the maximum function. This protocol is used in
the Softmax approximation in order to avoid that the exponential values explode. It takes an encrypted matrix 〈U|cl|×c〉, the approximations
intervals [ai,gi] and degrees d, and computes an encrypted vector 〈m〉 that contains a close approximation of the max of each column of 〈U〉.
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Symbol Description
DPi i
th Data provider
S, |S| Set ofDPs and its cardinality
Xn×c,yn Training dataset with c features,
n samples, and label vector
(X(i),y(i)) DPi’s part of the dataset
(X′,·) & y′ Querier’s evaluation data and prediction’s output
cl, |cl| Set of class labels and its cardinality
X[φ,·],X[·,φ] φth line and column ofX
y[φ] φth element of vector y
B∈X Random mini-batch of b rows
b Size of the mini-batch
W
(·,j)
G Global model at iteration j
W (i,j,l) DPi’s local model at global iter. j and local iter. l
W (i,j) DPi’s local model at global iter. j
wG,w Vector of global and
local weights
w(i,0) Initial local weights ofDPi
g,m Number of global, local iterations
lp Learning parameters
P(·) Protection mechanism
QR Querier request
σ(·) Activation function
d Degree of the approximated function
am Multiplicative depth of σ(·)
I(·) Indicator function
ni The number of data samples perDPi
P2(x) Next power of 2 of x
N1,N2 Diagonal approach parameters.
N1=P
2(max(c,b))/N2 &N2=b
√
P2(max(c,b))c
α, ρ Learning and elastic rates
sk,pk Secret key and public key
evk Evaluation key
〈v〉 Encrypted vector v
|ct| Size of fresh ciphertext ct
N Ring dimension
Q Fresh ciphertext modulus
L Number of available levels
τb Minimum level for Dbootstrap(·)
η Std. deviation of the noise distribution
∆ Plaintext Scale
mc Chain of moduli variables
DM Dot product
TABLE I: Frequently Used Symbols and Notations.20
